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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

BRIGHAM G. HOLBROOK and
BETTY HOLBROOK, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
Case No.

vs.

11767

'VILLIAM M. HODSON and
ROSE B. HODSON, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

PETITION FOR REHEARING

The decision of the Court dated March 12, 1970,
refers to the fact that on June 27, 1969 the Court denied
the petition of plaintiffs for an extraordinary writ, but
the decision gives no weight to that action. The matter
was argued before several of the Justices and the writ
was denied upon the stated reason that the District
Court had jurisdiction to consider the motion for relief
from late filing.
1

The dismissal of the appeal by the decision of
March 12, 1970 is in error for these reasons:
1. Rule 60 ( b) ( 1) provides relief after the time

for motion for new trial has run.

2. The motion for relief from late filing was a
60 (b) ( 1) motion.
3. Denial of respondents' petition for extraordinary writ was proper.
4. Dismissal of the appeal in June, 1969 for lack

of jurisdiction was not the order of the Court, and it
would have been erroneous on that ground.

ARGUMENT
POINT 1. RULE 60 (b) (1) PROVIDES
RELIEF AFTER THE TIME FOR MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL HAS RUN.
The Court holds that Rule 60 ( b) ( 1) does not
and cannot afford relief where the motion for new trial
is not filed within ten days after entry of judgment.
This is contrary to the language of 60 ( b) ( 1) and to
the prior holding of this Court in I(ettner v. Snow, 13
U.2d 382, 375 P. 2d 28, and to the holdings of the
United States Supreme Court under a similar rule in
Harris Truck Lines, Inc., v. Cherry Meat Packers,
Inc., 371 U.S. 215, 217, 9 L.Ed. 2d 261, 263, S. Ct. 283;
Thompson v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,
375 U.S. 389, 84 S. Ct. 397, 11 L.Ed. 2d 404; Wolf2

sohn v. Hankin, 376 U.S. 203, 84 S. Ct. 699, 11 L.Ed.
2d 636.
Rule 6 ( b) ( 1) provides for relief before the expiration of prescribed time and 6 ( b) ( 2) provides for
relief after expiration of the prescribed time,
". . . but it may not extend the time for taking
any action under Rules 25, 50 (b), 52 (b) ( d)
and (e), 60 (b) and 73 (a) and (g) except to
the extent and under the conditions stated in
them."
Rule 60 ( b) provides for relief from a final judg
ment for: " ( 1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." which motion shall be made within a
reasonable time "and for reasons ( 1), ( 2), ( 3), or ( 4)
not more than three months after the judgment, order,
or proceeding was entered or taken."
In Kettner v. Snow, supra, the defendant filed a
belated motion for new trial under Rule 60 (b). This
Court held that in a proper case, and for the reasons
stated in the rule such relief could be granted "and the
burden of showing facts to justify doing so is upon him
who seeks such relief."
That the motion for new trial may be filed late for
the reasons stated in Rule 60 ( b) ( 1) of the Federal
Rules, which is the same, is held by the Federal Courts.
In Thompson v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, supra, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal
because made outside the prescribed sixty-day period
after entry of judgment. But the Supreme Court
3

granted certiorari, citing Harris Truck Lines, supra,
because in the District Court the motion was treated as
having been timely filed until after the time to appeal
ran out. And this was done even though Rule 60 ( b)
( I ) was not specifically relied on.
As being analogous to Thompson, appellants point
out that their motion for new trial was filed February 6,
19G9. The defendants' motion to strike because the motion for new trial was late was not filed until March 26,
1969, apparently calculated to be after time for appeal
had run. In Thompson the Court had assumed that the
appeal was timely and counsel on the other side had
permitted that assumption. The Court felt that Thompson had been lulled into a false security. The Court and
the defendants in the case at bar also believed the motion for new trial was timely and had the plaintiffs acted
promptly to attack its timeliness the motion for new
trial could have been abandoned as having been filed
late and still there could have been a timely appeal.
Rule 73 (a) provides specifically that relief from
the passage of one month can be had only where the
excusable neglect is based upon "failure of a party to
learn of the judgment." There i.s no such limitation in
Rule 60 (b) (I), which provides relief from final judgments generally within three months after the judgment
was entered and thereafter for some reasons.
By adverting to Anderson v. Anderson, where no
question of a motion for new trial was involved and
there was simply a failure to take the appeal in time,
4

the Court in its decision has completely overlooked
Kettner v. Snow, supra, and the many federal cases
where relief has been given under 60 (b) ( 1) where motion for new trial has been filed after the time has run.

U.S. v. Wissohicken Tool Works (C. A. 2d 952),
200 F.2d 936; Nicholson v. Allied Chemical Corp. (Pa.
1961), 200 F. Supp. 206; Minneapolis Brewing Co. v.
Merritt (Md. 1956), 143 F. Supp. 146; U.S. v. Gould
(C. A. 5, 1962), 301 F.2d 353.

POINT 2. THE MOTION FOR RELIEF
FROl\I LATE FILING WAS A 60 (b) (1) MOTION.
The Court suggests that because interlineation was
made in the motion for relief from late filing on June
20, 1969, the motion then became for the first time a
60 ( b) ( 1 ) motion.
The language of the motion for relief from late
filing ( R-39) is plainly the language only of Rule 60
(b) ( 1) supported by the affidavit of counsel, which
plainly sets out the fact of inadvertence and excusable
neglect appropriate only to Rule 60 (b) and not to Rule
59.
Furthermore, there is good authority that a motion made under Rule 59 will be treated by the Court
as a motion under Rule 60 (b) where the facts are appropriate, consistent with a liberal interpretation and
application of Rule 60 (b). These are the holdings in
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U.S. v. Wissohicken Tool Works, supra; Columbia
River Packers Association v. Hinton, 34 F. Supp. 970,
reversed on other grounds 117 F.2d 310; Walling v.
Todd, 3 F.D.R. 490.
This is also the langauge of Moore's Federal Practice, Vol. 6-A, page 3849, where it is stated:
"The court may, however, treat the untimely
Rule 59 motion as a motion under Rule 60, in
order to determine if the movant has made out a
case for relief under the latter rule."
And again at pages 3851-3852 :Moore states:
"A motion for new trial that is made within the
ten day limit of Rule 59 ( b) invokes the obligatory discretion of the trial court, which must affirmatively exercise its discretion either to grant
or deny the motion. If, however, the motion is
not timely, the trial court may not exercise any
discretion, but is obligated to deny the motion for
lack of power to grant new trial relief, although
the court may treat the untimely motion as one
for relief under Rule 60, which has a much longer
time limit, if the facts alleged in the motion warrant relief under the latter rule."
This statement from Moore also bears out the previous statement that Anderson v. Anderson cited by this
Court in its decision is not analogous because there was
no consideration of Rule 60 (b) in the Anderson case.
POINT 3. DENIAL OF RESPONDENTS'
PETITION FOR EXTRAORDINARY WRIT
AS PROPER.

6

The chronology of the petition for extraordinary
writ was as follows: The motion to strike because motion for new trial was late was filed March 26 ' 1969
( R-34) ; the motion for relief from late filing with accompanying affidavit was served March 31, 1969 (R39-42); the Jay Holt affidavit was served April 2,
1969; and all were filed April 11, 1969 (R-39).
.

Judge Hanson then denied the motion to strike
and denied the motion for new trial on April 14, 1969,
in which he specifically found it "unnecessary to rule
on the defendants" motion for relief from late filing."
(R-43) The defendants then gave notice of appeal on
April 16, 1969, which appeal was dismissed June 2,
1969, and a remittitur issued (R-53). The court's order
recited "It is ordered that the same be granted and the
appeal dismissed.", without any reference to the pendency of the motion for relief from late filing, although
that was argued before this Court as Point 3 of a written memorandum of authorities filed with this Court in
its case No. 11597.
It is appellants' position that this simply returned
the case to the District Court, which was then confronted with the undisposed of "motion for relief from late
filing." This was noticed up for hearing on June 14,
1969 to be heard June 20, 1969, which was granted June
23, 1969 (R-57, 58, 59).

The plaintiffs then filed a petition for extraordinary relief on June 27, 1969 as case No. 11713. The
Court may recall that in denying this petition it was
7

stated by one of the Justices that the basis of the denial
of the petition was that the District Court had jurisdiction to determine the motion for relief from late
filing.
The District Court then proceeded to take jurisdiction of the motion for relief of late filing which it
granted ( R-58) and denied the motion for new trial on
July 23, I 969 ( R-73), and in the same order granted a
further hearing on the plaintiffs motion for order in
supplemental proceeding. Notice of appeal was then
taken on July 30, I969 (R-75).
The rationale of the denial of the petition for extraordinary writ seems to be as follows : After the motion
to strike the motion for new trial was filed defendants
scrutinized the pleadings and recognized the possibility
that the motion for new trial was filed late and therefore filed a motion for relief from late filing under Rule
60 (b). The District Court erroneously concluded that
the judgment was entered on the day it was received and
docketed in the Clerk's office and failed to dispose of
the motion for relief from late filing. This Court reversed the District Judge as to when the judgment is entered by dismissing the appeal and without giving a written decision. This Court could have passed on the pendency of the motion for relief from late filing, but instead
seemed to refer the matter to the District Court which
has discretion as to disposition of an application for
relief under Rule 60 (b). Wolfsohn v. Raab (E.D.Pa.),
II F.R.D. 254; Brest v. Philadelphia Transportation
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Co. (E.D.Pa. 1959), 273 F. 2d 22; John E. Smith's
Sons v. Lattimer Foundry
Machine
19 F.R.D.
379, affirmed 239 F. 2d 815; Nugent v. Yellow Cab
Co. ( C.A. 7, 1961) 295 F.2d 794, cert. den. 369 U.S.
828.

The merits of the motion for relief from late filing
under Rule 60 (b) ( 1) were before this Court on crossappeal (R-79, 80), and it is submitted that there is
ample support for Judge Hanson's ruling in the
cited herein. Also, if Judge Hanson was of the opinion
that the judgment was not entered until it was recorded
by the Clerk's office, it seems reasonable that counsel
could take the same view in examining the judgment of
the Court showing it to have been in the Clerk's office
on January 27.
POINT 4. DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL
IN JUNE, 1969 FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
"\VAS NOT THE ORDER OF THE COURT,
AND IT "\VOULD HAVE BEEN ERRONEOUS
ON THAT GROUND.
The language of the decision is:
"Plaintiffs contend that this appeal should be
dismissed. We agree; when this court initially
dismissed the appeal in June of 1969 for lack of
jurisdiction, the matter became final."
As above stated in the chronological statement, when
this case was first appealed there was pending in the
District Court the motion for relief from late filing and
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the only order made by this Court was that the appeal
should be dismissed, with no statement as to lack of jurisdiction and no statement as to finality. It was the dismissal of the appeal which brought before the District
Court as a matter of required consideration the motion
for relief from late filing, which the court had specifically ruled was not previously considered by it.
Appellants submit that the ruling of the Court on
July 14, 1969 was sound and recognized the jurisdiction
of the District Court to consider the motion for relief
from late filing, which the District Court did with ample
support for its action.
Appellants submit that the Court should grant a
rehearing before holding that the denial of the petition
for extraordinary writ was a nullity, or should grant
a rehearing on the merits of this appeal, so that the defendants, who certainly were not guilty of any inadvertance, can have the merits of their defense considered by
this Honorable Court.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD & WATKINS
By Richard L. Bird, Jr.
720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Attorneys for Petitioners-AppellantsDefendants.
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